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1. Introduction
A survey of pension systems internationally risks
becoming a long narrative that leaves the reader
unclear about why the paper was worth reading. To
avoid that fate, I shall start with the ‘So what?’
question – why is an international survey useful?
For the purposes of this conference I take the an-
swer to be: 
• that accounting standards have important effects
on the position of firms and, as a consequence,
on the welfare of workers and pensioners; 
• that with increasing labour mobility, accounting
standards need to apply internationally and, in
order to do so, need to be applicable to the wide
range of pension systems that exist across coun-
tries;
• that revision of accounting standards needs to be
forward looking, so that the survey should focus
less on a static snapshot of current systems than
on directions of change.1
As backdrop, it is important to understand why
the wide range of different systems is largely an
appropriate outcome, not a malign accident. Thus
the second part of the paper sets out lessons from
economic theory. The third part looks at directions
of change and discusses why pension systems are
changing in those directions. The fourth part dis-
cusses outcomes, looking at a selection of systems
in different countries. The paper concludes with an
epilogue on accounting, though I am not an ac-
counting expert, so discussion is brief.
2. Lessons from economic theory
This section suggests some conclusions from eco-
nomic theory: pension systems have multiple 
objectives; what matters is output; imperfect con-
sumer information and decision-making are perva-
sive; and pension schemes face large risks. The
section concludes with an important adjunct to the
theoretical discussion – the argument that imple-
mentation matters.
2.1. Pension systems have multiple objectives
From an individual viewpoint, income security
in old age requires two types of instruments: a
mechanism for consumption smoothing, and a
means of insurance. 
Consumption smoothing
People are not interested in income per se, but in
the consumption of goods and services – food,
clothing, bus rides, medical care, tickets to football
games, etc. People seek to maximise their well-
being not at a single point in time, but over time.
Someone who saves does so not because extra
consumption today has no value, but because he
values extra consumption in the future more high-
ly. Most people hope to live long enough to be able
to retire, so a central purpose of retirement pen-
sions is consumption smoothing, whereby people
seek to transfer consumption from their productive
middle years to their retired years.2
Insurance
In a world of certainty, individuals save during
working life to finance their retirement. However,
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 39. No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. pp. 211-225 211
International trends in pension provision
Nicholas Barr*
Abstract—This paper considers international trends in pension arrangements, starting with lessons from econom-
ic theory. The analysis includes recent developments in the economics of information and behavioural economics,
developments which call into question conventional arguments in favour of voluntarism and free competition.
Section 3 of the paper considers why pension systems are developing the way they are – largely a response to a se-
ries of long-term trends. In light of the discussion in Sections 2 and 3, Section 4 of the paper describes pension sys-
tems in a range of countries, and illustrates the wide range of options available to a developed country. Section 5
reflects briefly on accounting standards.
The paper offers a number of key messages. Pension systems have multiple objectives. Second, and, in part, a
consequence, there is no single best pension system. Third, policy design is not enough – the design of pension 
systems must be compatible with a country’s capacity to implement the design effectively.
Keywords: behavioural economics; funded pensions; PAYG pensions; pension finance; pension reform
*The author is Professor of Public Economics at the
London School of Economics and Political Science.
This paper draws heavily on Barr and Diamond (forthcom-
ing). For a summary of the underpinning economic theory, see
Barr and Diamond (2006, 2009).
Correspondence should be addressed to: N.Barr@lse.ac.uk.
1 This paper is about the economics of pensions, not about
accounting aspects. The latter are addressed in the other pa-
pers presented at this conference, viz. Glaum (2009),  Kiosse
and Peasnell (2009), Landsman (2009) and Napier (2009).
2 This process is explained more formally by the simple
Fisher model.  See, for example, Barr (2001, ch. 2).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:58
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
people generally do not know how long they are
going to live. Thus a pension based on individual
savings faces the risk that the person will outlive
those savings. Though any one person does not
know how long he is going to live, the life ex-
pectancy of a large group is better known. Thus
members of a group could agree to pool their pen-
sion savings, with each person drawing a pension
based on: (a) the group’s life expectancy; and (b)
the total amount he or she had contributed to the
pool. This is the essence of annuities, whereby an
individual exchanges his pension accumulation at
retirement for regular payments for the rest of his
or her life, thus allowing people to insure against
the risk of outliving their pension savings.
Alongside these individual objectives, public
policy generally has additional goals.
Poverty relief
Poverty relief targets resources on people who are
poor on a lifetime basis, and thus unable to save
enough. As a practical matter, poverty relief also
has to address transient poverty. 
Redistribution
Pension systems can redistribute on a lifetime
basis, for example, by paying pensions to low
earners that are a higher percentage of their previ-
ous earnings (i.e. a higher replacement rate), thus
subsidising the consumption smoothing of lower
earners. Since life-long earnings are uncertain
from the perspective of an individual, such a sys-
tem provides some insurance against low earnings.
There can also be redistribution towards families,
for example, paying a higher pension to a married
couple than to a single person, even though both
families have paid the same contributions. Pension
systems can also redistribute across generations,
for example, if a government reduces the contribu-
tion rate of the present generation, thereby requir-
ing future generations to pay higher contributions
or have lower pensions.
Alongside these primary objectives, pensions
policy may have secondary goals, including eco-
nomic growth. There is debate about the relative
weights accorded to old age security and to sec-
ondary objectives. 
Implications
To address multiple objectives, well-designed pen-
sions need to have multiple components. Sound
analysis should consider the pension system as a
whole, rather than focus unduly on one compo-
nent, ignoring the others. The term ‘pension sys-
tem’ therefore recurs throughout the paper.
2.2. The macroeconomics of pensions: what 
matters is output
There are two (and only two) ways of seeking
security in old age. One is to store current produc-
tion for future use. With the exception of housing,
this approach is inadequate for most consumption
needs: it is expensive; it does not address uncer-
tainty (e.g. about how a person’s tastes might
change); and it cannot be applied to services deriv-
ing from human capital, notably medical services. 
The second approach is for individuals to ex-
change production when younger for a claim on
future production when older. There are two broad
ways to do so: (1) by saving part of his wages, a
worker could build up a pile of assets which he
would exchange for goods produced by younger
people after his retirement; or (2) he could obtain
a promise – from his children, his employer, or
government – that he would be given goods pro-
duced by younger workers after his retirement.
The two main ways of organising pensions broad-
ly parallel these two types of claim. Funded
schemes are based on accumulations of financial
assets, Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) schemes on prom-
ises (see definitions in Box 1). 
The purpose of pensions is to allow people to
continue to consume after they have stopped work-
ing. As noted earlier, pensioners are not interested
in money per se, but in consumption. Thus future
output is central. PAYG and funding are simply fi-
nancial mechanisms for organising claims on that
future output. In macroeconomic terms, though
there are differences between the two approaches,
those differences should not be exaggerated.
The centrality of output remains true in an open
economy. In principle, pensioners are not con-
strained to consumption of domestically-produced
goods, but can consume goods made abroad so
long as they can organise a claim on those goods.
If British workers use some of their savings to buy
Australian factories, they can, in retirement, sell
their share of the factory’s output for Australian
money to buy Australian goods, which they then
import to the UK. This approach, though useful, is
no panacea. The policy breaks down if Australian
workers all retire; thus the age structure of the pop-
ulation in the destination of foreign investment
matters. Second, if large numbers of British pen-
sioners exchange Australian dollars for other cur-
rencies, the Australian exchange rate might fall,
reducing the real value of the pension. Thus the
ideal country in which to invest has a young pop-
ulation and products one wants to buy and politi-
cal and financial stability and is large enough to
absorb the savings of other countries with ageing
populations. Countries with ageing populations in-
clude all of the OECD, and many others, China
being a notable example. 
Implications
Overlooking the importance of output leads to 
errors. Though the point was shown to be flawed 
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many years ago,3 such a widespread error is the 
argument that funding necessarily assists pension
finance.
Suppose that a large workforce is followed by a
smaller workforce. In a pure PAYG scheme the
revenue from a given contribution rate falls, creat-
ing upward pressure on the contribution rate,
downward pressure on the level of pensions, or
both. This problem is well-understood and not
controversial.
Funding, it is argued, can ease the problem: each
member of the large workforce in period 1 builds
up pension savings; the pension available for a
representative worker is exactly what can be cov-
ered by those savings; if there is a large number of
such workers, this is not a problem, it is argued,
because each worker accumulates enough, on av-
erage, to pay for his or her own pension. This ar-
gument is correct in terms of finance but may fail
to provide workers with the consumption they ex-
pect in old age. With PAYG, the shortfall comes
through a decline in social security contributions.
With funding, the mechanism is less direct but has
the same cause: unless a decline in the number of
workers has no effect on output, output will fall;
and if output falls consumption and/or investment
must fall. Lower rates of return or higher prices
deny pensioners the consumption they expected;
or mandatory increases in pension savings by
workers reduce their consumption by more than
they would choose; or the increase in the com-
bined consumption of workers and pensioners is at
the expense of investment, and hence puts future
growth at risk. As noted, PAYG and funding are
both mechanisms for organising claims on future
output; since demographic change generally af-
fects that output, it generally causes problems for
pension schemes however they are organised.
Even more clearly, suppose that the birth rate is
stable but the life expectancy of pensioners in-
creases, thus increasing the number of pensioners
per worker. With pure PAYG this increase requires
a higher contribution rate or lower monthly bene-
fits. With funding and no change in interest rates,
the sustainable level of monthly benefits is lower
if retirement is longer.
What matters is not financial accumulation but
output. If output increases, it becomes easier to
meet the claims of both workers and pensioners.
The solution to population ageing lies not in fund-
ing per se but in output growth. 
2.3. The micro-economics of pensions: imperfect
consumer information and decision-making are
pervasive
Two bodies of literature help to explain why
choices about saving and pension provision may
be suboptimal: that on the economics of informa-
tion, and a recent and growing literature on behav-
ioural economics (see UK Pensions Commission,
2004a: 207–210; Tapia and Yermo, 2007; and
Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
Imperfect information
Individuals can be misinformed in various ways:
• Some individuals have a poor sense of the risks
and uncertainties they face, for example, about
their longevity.
• Individuals can be badly informed about com-
plex pension products which are based on an
array of financial institutions and financial in-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 213
Box 1
Terminology
• Defined-benefit pensions. In this arrangement a person’s pension is based on his or her wage history and
commonly on length of service. Thus, a pure arrangement adjusts funds to meet anticipated obligations, 
so the risk of varying rates of return to pension assets falls on the organiser, i.e. the employer or the 
government.
• Defined-contribution pensions. In this case a person’s pension is determined only by the amount of assets 
accumulated toward his or her pension. Thus, a pure scheme adjusts obligations to match available funds,
and so the risk of varying rates of return to pension assets falls on the individual. 
• Funded pensions are paid from an accumulated fund built up over a period of years out of contributions by
or on behalf of its members.
• Notional defined-contribution (NDC) pensions. At root, NDC pensions have two elements: they are organ-
ised on a PAYG basis; but they mimic funded individual accounts in that a person’s pension is strictly relat-
ed to his or her lifetime pension contributions. Pensions may be adjusted for the cohort’s life expectancy, and
credits may be offered for periods spent caring for children.
• Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions are paid out of current revenue (usually by the state, from tax revenue)
rather than out of an accumulated fund.
3 Barr (1979); for a recent restatement see Barr (2000, IIA).
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struments. Many do not understand basic con-
cepts in finance: Orszag and Stiglitz (2001: 37)
quote the chairman of the US Securities and
Exchange Commission as stating that over 50%
of Americans did not know the difference be-
tween a stock and a bond. The problem also has
distributional implications, since the worst-
informed people are disproportionately among
the least well-off; that is, information poverty
and financial poverty are highly correlated. 
• For some purposes it is useful to recognise that
the problem may not be an information problem
but an information processing problem. An in-
formation problem can be solved by providing
the necessary information. With an information
processing problem, matters are too complex for
many people to choose well even when they
have the necessary information. Such problems
are more likely where the time horizon is long,
where the product or service involves complex
probabilities, or where information about the
features of the product is inherently complex.
All these conditions characterise most pension
products.
Imperfect decision making
The literature on behavioural economics sheds
considerable light on decision making. In the con-
text of old-age security, many people do not save
enough voluntarily. Instead widespread manifesta-
tions of suboptimal behaviour are observed.
Delayed choice or no choice:
• Procrastination: people delay saving, do not
save, or do not save enough. With retirement
saving, as elsewhere, people agree that they
should do more but delay action (Choi et al.,
2001). 
• Avoiding explicit choice: in theory it should
make no difference whether individuals face an
opt-in or an opt-out provision; in practice, auto-
matic enrolment leads to much higher participa-
tion. Participation rates in employer 401(k)
plans in the USA differ sharply depending on
whether or not enrolment was automatic with an
opt-out (Madrian and Shea, 2001).
• Immobilisation: complexity and conflicting in-
formation can lead to passive behaviour. People
presented with a larger range of 401(k) options
participate less. A large fraction of new workers
in Sweden make no choice at all. 
Faulty choice:
When people do choose, their choices may make
little sense:
• Short-term gratification: many people retire at
the earliest age permitted, which may be too
early for their own good or that of their spouses. 
• Framing: choices are influenced by how they are
presented. ‘[P]eople who learn first about the
risks of a treatment followed by its benefits
make different choices than people who first
learn about its benefits and then its risks.
Decision aid developers have no choice but 
to present information in one order or another,
but unfortunately the order they choose will al-
most inevitably affect people’s decisions’
(Loewenstein and Ubel (2008: 1806).
• Familiarity: another poor but common choice is
to invest heavily in the stock of one’s employer;
if the firm goes bankrupt, employees lose both
their wage income and much of their capital ac-
cumulation, as with employees of Enron. Such
behaviour shows a total failure to grasp the ben-
efits of diversifying risk.
• Herd instinct: People follow fashion, as in the
technology boom of the late 1990s. 
Recent experimental evidence suggests that peo-
ple can have a high discount rate in the short term
(that is, a tendency to instant gratification) and a
lower one in the medium term. The problem is that
when the future arrives, it becomes the present;
hence short-term gratification continues.
Implications
Thus people can be myopic and may make deci-
sions that do not reflect their own best interests.
The problem is not trivial, so that the simple as-
sumption of rational utility maximisation may not
hold for pensions. What is needed is what econo-
mists call second-best analysis.
More concretely, these findings suggest a num-
ber of implications for policy design, many of
them exemplified by the US Thrift Savings Plan
discussed in Box 3:
• Keep choices simple to address information
problems, for example, by offering only a small
number of clearly differentiated funds.
• Use automatic enrolment, thus turning inertia to
the individual’s advantage: once automatically
enrolled, most people will stay with the scheme.
• Design a good default option: an arrangement
based on automatic enrolment plus worker
choice of schemes requires a default option for
workers who do not make a choice (see Beshears
et al., 2008).
2.4. Stochastic elements: pension schemes face
large risks
All pension schemes face some risk.
• Macroeconomic shocks affect output, prices or
both. 
214 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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• Demographic shocks affect all pension schemes
by affecting market prices and quantities and
pension claims.
• Political risks affect all pension schemes be-
cause all depend critically, albeit in different
ways, on effective government.
Pensions that accumulate funds face additional
risks:
• Management risk can arise through incompe-
tence or fraud, which imperfectly informed con-
sumers generally cannot monitor effectively. 
• Investment risk: accumulations held in the stock
market until retirement are vulnerable to market
fluctuations.
• Annuities market risk: for a given pension accu-
mulation, the value of an annuity depends on re-
maining life expectancy and on the rate of return
the annuity provider can expect over those years. 
Implications
Some risks are faced by any pension system, oth-
ers only by particular arrangements. Thus key ele-
ments in any pension system are: (a) how to
accommodate risk; and (b) how risks are distrib-
uted across participants.
Private insurance markets can help individuals
to bear some of the risks inherent in preparing for
retirement. But there are limits to private insurance
from adverse selection, from selling costs, from
the limited ability of consumers to make good de-
cisions, and from incomplete markets for risk-
sharing, particularly across cohorts. Social
insurance can share risk more broadly, not least
because governments have a wider array of instru-
ments for sharing risks than do private markets.
The costs of adverse outcomes can be borne by the
pensioner through lower pensions, by workers
through higher contributions, by the taxpayer,
through tax-funded subsidies to pensions, and/or
by future taxpayers and beneficiaries if subsidies
are financed by government borrowing. 
2.5. Administrative elements: implementation
matters
Good policy design is important; but the best de-
sign will fail to achieve its objectives if financial,
political and administrative capacity are lacking.
Policy design that exceeds a country’s capacity to
implement it is bad policy design. The importance
of implementation is often underestimated. It re-
quires skills that are just as demanding as policy
design, and those skills need to be involved when
the policy is designed, not as an afterthought. 
Implications
A state scheme needs to be compatible with the
government’s capacity to run it effectively. An
earnings-related public pension requires that gov-
ernment can:
• track and record a worker’s earnings across an
entire working life;
• track across jobs, employment status, and geo-
graphical regions;
• keep workers informed through regular state-
ments;
• calculate benefits accurately;
• pay benefits accurately and promptly;
• make the calculations and adjustments necessary
to keep the system financially sustainable, either
automatically or by legislated changes.
Merely listing these requirements emphasises their
stringency. 
Administrative costs in private schemes are im-
portant and often overlooked. The administrative
costs of individual accounts are significant even in
large, developed countries with long-established
systems, and considerably higher for small ac-
counts in small countries starting a new system.
For example, a charge of 1% of assets each year
over a 40-year career reduces accumulations by
nearly 20% at retirement.
Problems are not restricted to developing
economies. Pensions were mis-sold in the UK in
the 1980s. Problems can also arise with the regula-
tion of private defined-benefit schemes. When a
firm or industry with an inadequately funded de-
fined-benefit pension gets into financial trouble,
its workers and retirees lose some or all of the 
pension they were expecting. Countries have re-
sponded in a range of ways, including govern-
ment-provided guarantees and the imposition of
funding requirements. None of these is a perfect
solution. Policies designed to ensure the long-term
stability of defined-benefit schemes face an inher-
ent tension: too little regulation leaves workers
with inadequate protection, but too much imposes
excessive costs on a scheme’s sponsor, often at in-
opportune times, leading to withdrawal of the
scheme, at least for new members. We return to the
issue of regulatory design and accounting stan-
dards in the concluding section. 
3. Drivers of change: why are things 
developing as they are?
This section discusses trends over the past century
that frame pensions policy, and a series of more re-
cent changes over the postwar period. It then dis-
cusses how policy makers have responded. The
section concludes by discussing why things are 
developing as they are.
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 215
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3.1. Long-term trends
The pensions ‘crisis’ is not a surprise, but the re-
sult of a series of well-known long-term trends.
Demographic change – Life expectancy has been
rising for a long time. Declining fertility is occur-
ring not only in industrialised but also in poorer
countries. Both trends are widespread, including
the USA, Western and Northern Europe, the
European former-communist countries, Japan and
many developing countries.
Declining labour-force participation of older
male workers – This trend is, in part, a response to
rising living standards. As people become richer,
they can afford more leisure. Thus the labour-force
participation of older workers in many countries is
considerably lower than for younger workers.
Earlier retirement and longer life combine to in-
crease the duration of retirement, which ranged
from 15 years for men in Japan in 1999 (where
25% of men are still working at 77), to nearly 
21 years in Italy, and even longer for women.
3.2. Changes over the postwar period
Superimposed on these long trends are changes
since the end of the Second World War. 
Growth in pension systems – Pension systems
before the Second World War tended to cover
urban workers, but often not workers in agricul-
ture, and to offer only small benefits. Extension of
pension systems has been a widespread feature of
postwar policy. 
The baby boom is fairly widespread and, when
combined with demographic trends, has powerful
effects in some countries. But its importance
should not be exaggerated. Barr and Diamond
(2008: Figure 1.5) show that projected age pyra-
mids for 2050 are not strikingly different in a
country like the USA from a country like India,
which had no baby boom.
Growth of female labour-force participation –
The archetype of male breadwinner and female
caregiver was never the entire story in the West,
and female labour-force participation was always
high in the Soviet system. Over the postwar period
throughout Western countries, women in increas-
ing numbers have increasingly taken on paid work.
In the short term, the presence of more workers
eases the short-term finances of a PAYG system. A
separate implication is the need to design systems
that properly recognise entitlements that a woman
builds on the basis of her own earnings record.
All these elements – the long-term trends and
postwar changes – have direct and obvious impli-
cations for the costs of pension systems. Two fur-
ther changes have important implications for other
aspects of pension design.
A changing international environment
Alongside reduced restrictions on international
trade and finance has been increasing awareness of
international labour mobility. The treatment of mi-
grants and – connected – the international portabil-
ity of pension rights, is a matter of growing
salience, notably the unresolved issue of how to
organise pension rights within the wider EU.
More fluid family structures
In many countries, the nuclear family has neither
the stability nor the numerical dominance it had 
50 years ago. In a world where most people were
in stable marriages, the most common reason for
women being single was widowhood, which could
be addressed by including widows’ benefits in a
pension system. Today, in addition, many women
are single after a divorce or were never married. In
the UK, something like 40% of mothers can now
expect to be a lone mother for some part of their
adult life.4 Pension systems need to be designed to
accommodate living arrangements that are diverse
across people and changing life patterns. 
3.3. Responses 1: Developments in pension 
design
The economic and social context in which pen-
sions operate today is thus very different from that
in 1950: the economic and social environment is
different; there has been a natural maturing of pen-
sion systems; and change is required to accommo-
date long-term trends. This section discusses how
policy makers have responded, starting with devel-
opments in pension design and then, in the next
section, the options for adjusting pension systems
to long-term trends.
Addressing gaps in coverage
Though systems with wide coverage have reduced
poverty rates, poverty among older people re-
mains. The problem arises partly from incomplete
contributions records. Incomplete coverage arises
in countries with immature pension systems, limit-
ed institutional capacity and/or a large informal
sector. However, it also comes from fragmented
careers and fluid family structures even in coun-
tries with nearly full coverage. Thus it is no acci-
dent that even in advanced countries not all
workers have a full contributions record. In the
UK in 2005 only about 85% of recent male retirees
and 30% of women retirees were entitled to a full
basic state pension.
It is thus mistaken to imagine that better admin-
istration is a complete answer. The design of pen-
sion systems must recognise that gaps in
contributions will occur. One approach has been to
adjust the contribution rules, for example, by ex-
tending contribution credits to people who are un-
employed or caring for young children. Another
has been to reduce the number of years to qualify
216 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
4 Of that total, about half will be a lone parent for more than
five years (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000).
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for a pension. 
A different approach, recognising that gaps in
contributions are unavoidable, is to have a 
non-contributory universal pension, as outlined in
Box 2. 
Indexing benefits
Indexing pensions in payment is central to effi-
cient consumption smoothing. Countries have 
incorporated indexing, sometimes to prices, some-
times to wages, and sometimes to a mix. As well
as indexing benefits in payment, an additional de-
velopment in many countries has been to index
contributions or earnings records during working
life, usually to wages.
Changing the basis of indexation can have sig-
nificant effects. In the later 1980s, reforms in the
UK indexed the basic state pension to changes in
prices rather than (as previously) to wages. As a
result, the basic state pension fell from around
20% of average earnings in the mid-1980s to 
16% in 2002 (UK Pensions Commission, 2004b:
Figure F.3).
Adjusting gender balance
Over the last half century, many countries have
moved the legal structure of their pension 
system towards or fully to gender neutrality. The
increased fluidity of family structures means that
basing a woman’s benefits substantially on her 
husband’s contributions is increasingly unsatisfac-
tory. Because of changed attitudes it is also wide-
ly regarded as undesirable, with increasing empha-
sis on the rights of women as citizens.5 A
well-designed pension system should seek to be
gender-neutral but should also recognise the exis-
tence of families. Thus pension design should pro-
tect the rights of spouses in respect of the death of
one member of a couple and of divorce. A separate
issue is whether, how and to what extent a pension
system should recognise years spent caring for
children. 
Introducing notional defined contribution (NDC)
pensions
A recent innovation in pension design, NDC pen-
sions (see Box 1) have been implemented in a
number of countries, including Sweden and some
of the post-communist countries. 
Addressing the administrative costs of individual
accounts
Administrative costs have important ramifications.
As noted, over a full career an annual management
charge of 1% reduces a person’s pension accumu-
lation, and hence his pension, by about 20%. It is 
no accident that competition has not led to low 
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Box 2
Non-contributory pensions
Non-contributory pensions address coverage, with the great potential advantage of extending benefits to 
people with limited contributions records, especially women, people with fragmented careers, and workers in
the informal sector.
High-income countries – New Zealand and the Netherlands have non-contributory pensions financed from 
general revenue or earmarked taxes, payable to everyone who meets a residency requirement. Australia has a
similar system, but the benefit is subject not to an income test, designed to restrict benefits to the poor, but to
an affluence test, which has the more limited purpose of clawing back benefits from the rich. 
Middle-income countries – South Africa has a non-contributory pension, illustrating how such an arrangement
can work in a developing country and, moreover, can extend to the rural population. As discussed below, Chile
introduced a non-contributory pension in 2008. 
Low-income countries – A number of low-income countries have non-contributory pensions (sometimes 
called social pensions), including Bolivia, Botswana, Namibia, and Nepal. Total spending is typically small
(below 1% of GDP in Botswana, Namibia, and Nepal), and the benefit is also generally small (Willmore, 2006:
Table 1).
Where a government has the necessary implementation capacity, policymakers have a range of options to con-
tain costs:
• The level of the pension can be kept low (for example, it is only 10% of GDP per capita in Botswana and
Nepal).
• The age at which the pension is first paid can be set high (in Nepal only 1.1% of the population are older
than the qualifying age).
5 In the UK, until 1978, a married woman could opt to pay
a greatly reduced national insurance contribution which gave
no entitlement to a pension, on the basis that she was covered
by her husband’s contribution.  Such an arrangement today
would be unthinkable, as well as violating EU law. 
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administrative costs. Individual accounts offering
the individual a choice of provider or of portfolio
are inherently costly to administer; moreover,
those costs are largely a fixed overhead per ac-
count and hence are particularly an issue for small-
er accumulations. Thus policies aimed at
strengthening competition have been tried but, in
the absence of stringent regulation, have not been
very successful.
In response to increasing awareness of the size
of these costs, countries have explored other ways
to reduce them. Sweden has centralised much of
the administration, which it combines with price
controls. The US Thrift Savings Plan, for federal
civil servants (Box 3), has combined centralisation
with very limited choice. The UK is proposing to
introduce a simple savings scheme with limited
choice and centralised account administration.
A system with a government-selected portfolio
can have lower transaction costs, but can easily
have a low rate of return. Good quality investment
is more likely with transparent accounting, includ-
ing a clear and explicit remit, independent non-
political management, and detailed, published 
audited accounts. 
Strengthening the governance of private pensions
Strengthening the regulation of financial markets
has been an ongoing and necessary process in all
countries including the most advanced. In parallel,
many countries have increased the requirement
that private pensions be funded and strengthened
the regulation of private pensions. 
Strengthening funding requirements is meant to
safeguard the future interests of current workers
and to protect government revenues if the govern-
ment insures pensions. On the face of it, stringent
funding requirements will benefit workers; but as
discussed earlier, it can be counterproductive to
impose on employers too much of the cost or too
much of the risk. 
3.4. Responses 2: Economic adjustment to 
long-term trends 
Countries have responded in a range of ways –
mostly recently – to financial imbalances. Some
policy makers ignored the problem, with deficits
paid out of general taxation, as in some countries
in the wider EU. A range of other policy directions
is generally more realistic: higher contributions,
lower pensions, and later retirement. Economic
growth also assists adjustment, so policies to raise
output, such as increased saving, are also an im-
portant part of the picture.
Higher contributions
Contributions have tended to rise in most coun-
tries, by increasing the percentage rate of contribu-
tion or raising the range of income on which
contributions are payable. Though there is room
for variation, contribution rates face the constraint
of incentive effects, particularly in the face of in-
ternational competition. Given the extent of popu-
lation ageing in many countries and existing
contribution rates, higher contributions on their
own are not usually a complete solution.
Lower pensions
If people live longer and nothing else changes, the
average pension will have to fall. This approach
avoids fiscal problems, but risks pensioner pover-
ty. In countries with NDC systems, for example,
Sweden and Poland, the level of benefits decreas-
es automatically in response to increased life ex-
pectancy. As an NDC system is quasi-actuarial,
people can offset the decline in benefits by work-
ing longer. 
Later retirement
People are living longer; that is not a problem, but
a triumph. The problem is not that people are liv-
ing longer but that they retire too early given in-
creased healthy lifetimes and the contribution rates
in place. If we were designing a pension system
for a new planet whose native life form was living
longer and longer, we would not choose an earliest
entitlement age that was fixed for all time at age
65. Thus governments are seeking: (a) to increase
the employment rates of all workers including
older workers; and (b) to encourage labour-market
flexibility so that older workers have choice over
the move from full-time work to full retirement. 
Pensions, saving and growth
Policies to promote growth are an important part
of the response to demographic trends. One ele-
ment is higher saving from additional revenues.
The Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund
(Norway Central Bank, 2005, 2006) uses some of
the revenues from oil taxation, as a buffer against
demographic change. The US has built up a trust
fund, with payroll tax rates above that needed to
cover expenditures, to be run down as part of ac-
commodating the retirement of the baby-boomers.
Also of concern are broader strategies to pro-
mote growth:
• Measures that can increase worker productivity
include more and better capital equipment, im-
proving the allocation of capital by better capital
markets and tax policies, improving the quality
of the labour force through more education and
training, and improving labour mobility to allo-
cate labour more productively.
• Measures that can increase the number of work-
ers from each age cohort include policies to in-
crease labour supply (for example, by married
women by offering better childcare facilities),
raising the average age of retirement, raising fer-
tility and importing labour.
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The message for policy makers is to consider the
entire menu of pro-growth policies.
In sum, the problems of pension finance are re-
solved if output rises sufficiently. To the extent
that that does not happen (faulty policy) or cannot
happen (environmental constraints), the remaining
options are to reduce the consumption of workers
through higher contributions, or the consumption
of pensioners either by paying a lower monthly
benefit or by paying a given monthly benefit only
at a later age.
3.5. Why things are developing as they are
Increased longevity, declining fertility and re-
duced labour-force participation by older men are
all trends that are long-term and well-known. In
principle they can be addressed by adjusting con-
tributions and benefits, by increasing retirement
age without a compensating increase in benefits,
and by policies to increase output. Thus the current
‘crisis’ is not a crisis. It is a problem that has
known and long-term causes and known solutions.
The problem is not so much the underlying eco-
nomic and demographic realities than the political
difficulty of making the necessary changes.
Pension systems are developing the way they are
mainly because of lack of adjustment to long-term
pressures. The problem is not an economic failure
but a political failure.
4. Outcomes: why do systems differ?
Drawing on previous discussion, this section starts
by explaining why there is not – and cannot be – a
single best pension system. It then gives brief de-
scriptions of pension systems in a range of coun-
tries, and concludes by setting out the range of
options available to a developed economy.
4.1. No single best pension system
The argument that there is no single best pension
system derives from economic theory, which deter-
mines what is optimal, and from considerations of
implementation, which determine what is feasible.
The argument is straightforward. Pensions have
multiple objectives, notably the achievement of
consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief
and redistribution.
In pursuit of these objectives countries face a series
of constraints:
• Fiscal capacity: other things being equal, a 
larger tax base can finance a given pension with
a lower contribution rate and hence less potential
distortion. 
• Institutional capacity: stronger institutional ca-
pacity enlarges the formal tax base and makes
feasible a wider range of options for pension de-
sign.
• The empirical value of behavioural parameters,
such as the responsiveness of labour supply to
the design of the pension system, and the effect
of pensions on saving.
• The shape of the pre-transfer income distribu-
tion: a heavier lower tail of the income distribu-
tion increases the need for poverty relief. 
There is no single best system for several reasons:
• Objectives can differ: policy makers will attach
different relative weights to the objectives, in-
cluding the importance of poverty relief and
about how risks should be shared within and
across generations.
• Constraints differ: the pattern of constraints, in-
cluding the values of key parameters, will differ
over time and across countries. 
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Box 3
The US Thrift Savings Plan
The US Thrift Savings Plan for federal civil servants (www.tsp.gov), established in 1986, is a response to the
need to contain administrative costs and also to the information and decision-making problems discussed in
Section 2.
Initially voluntary, the scheme has now moved to auto-enrolment. The scheme offers participants very limited
choice. In 2007, workers could choose from six funds, including funds holding government bonds, private
bonds, a stock market index or a global stock market index; another option was a fund that moved from equi-
ties to bonds over the worker’s life cycle. A government agency keeps centralised records of individual port-
folios. Fund management is on a wholesale basis. Investment in private sector assets is handled by private
financial firms, which bid for the opportunity (and which manage the same portfolios in the voluntary private
market). As a result, administrative costs are astonishingly low: as little as 6 basis points annually, or 60 cents
per $1,000 of account balance.
The approach should be of interest to other countries considering reform, in particular to developing countries
where institutional capacity is limited. 
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• Political processes differ, affecting what is polit-
ically feasible.
4.2. What are the different systems?
Countries have chosen systems which vary from
more or less pure consumption smoothing in the
form of mandatory saving with little or no insur-
ance (Singapore, which has a state-administered
provident fund, in essence a savings plan) to a sys-
tem whose primary concern is poverty relief
through a non-contributory flat-rate pension, with
consumption smoothing on a voluntary basis (New
Zealand). In between, a wide range of systems ex-
plicitly address both objectives, some with sub-
stantial reliance on mandatory funding (Chile),
some with intermediate reliance on mandatory
funding (Sweden, USA), and others mainly on the
basis of PAYG arrangements (France, Germany,
Italy). The Netherlands has a non-contributory
PAYG universal pension, based on years of resi-
dence, together with funded occupational pen-
sions. Reforms in Chile, discussed below,
strengthen poverty relief by introducing a non-
contributory PAYG universal pension alongside its
existing system of individual funded accounts.
Thus countries have successfully implemented
pension systems using very different structures.6
Most of the illustrations that follow are from de-
veloped countries, the exceptions being Chile,
whose pension reform of 1981 has fascinated com-
mentators and influenced other countries, and
China, which illustrates how over-ambitious re-
form can run into implementation problems.7
Chile
Since 1981, Chile has had a system of mandatory,
funded, privately-managed individual accounts,
with free entry for any firm able to meet heavy
regulatory requirements. Employees are required
to contribute 10% of earnings. Workers may take
their pensions as inflation-indexed annuities or as
phased withdrawals. 
The individual accounts provide consumption
smoothing, supported by various institutions to as-
sist poverty relief. Until 2008, a minimum pension
guarantee, financed from general revenue, was
available for those who had contributed to the
mandatory system for at least 20 years; in addition,
a means-tested pension, also financed by general
revenue, paid a benefit at about half the level of the
minimum guarantee.
The post-1981 system in Chile was rooted in
competitive supply, the argument being that com-
petition would increase choice and drive down ad-
ministrative costs. Not least because of the
information and decision-making problems dis-
cussed in Section 2, these predictions were not
borne out. A Chilean Senator at a conference in
2004 spoke of the seven ‘deadly sins’ of Chilean
pensions: low coverage, low pensions, high ad-
ministrative costs, high fiscal costs, gender in-
equality, limited competition, and political tests for
Boards of Directors of pension funds.
For such reasons, a Presidential Advisory
Council on Pension Reform was appointed. The
central recommendation of its Report (Chile
Presidential Advisory Council, 2006), was to 
replace the minimum guarantee and the means-
tested pension by a non-contributory basic pension
financed out of taxation, payable to the poorest
two-thirds of the population. The non-contributory
pension is being phased in from 2008.
In sum, the post-1981 system in Chile gave
heavy weight to consumption smoothing, with
some insurance through voluntary annuitisation
and with limited weight to poverty relief. The pri-
mary lessons are threefold:
• Mandatory funded individual accounts can be
part of a good reform, but such a reform is not
easy and depends on complementary reforms.
• Private supply plus competition are not on their
own sufficient to keep down transactions costs
or charges.
• Unless accompanied by a robust system of
poverty relief, individual accounts are not a pen-
sion system, but only a part of a pension system.
China
Since 1997, China has moved from an enterprise-
based system of defined-benefit pensions based on
final salary towards a unified system for urban
workers. The new system has three elements: a 
defined-benefit, PAYG, first-tier pension (the social
pool); a mandatory, funded, defined-contribution
pension; and voluntary, enterprise-based pensions. 
Since 1999, coverage was expanded with the in-
tention of including the employees of private and
other types of enterprises in urban areas, the self-
employed, and (it was hoped) the informal sector.
But the expansion of coverage has been limited.
The system is financed by dedicated contributions,
mainly from firms and workers, with some financ-
ing also from government. 
This system makes long-term strategic sense but
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6 For useful institutional description, see OECD (2007), the
international updates issued by the US Social Security admin-
istration on http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_up-
date/, and the resources in the Global Aging Program of the
American Association of Retired People (AARP) on
http://www.aarp.org/research/international/map/. 
7 I participated in recent reforms of the pension system in
Chile, including discussions with the Presidential Advisory
Council in May 2006.  And Peter Diamond and I were mem-
bers of a group invited to advise the government of China on
pension reform – see Asher et al. (2005) for the report of the
group.
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has not functioned as intended. The three elements
together offer poverty relief, insurance, and con-
sumption smoothing, with some allowance for dif-
fering tastes. However, there are serious problems
of fragmentation, system financial deficits, and ad-
ministrative difficulties. These are particularly vis-
ible with the funded individual accounts.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands has a non-contributory pension of
70% of the net minimum wage, payable at age 65.
The system differs in two respects from conven-
tional public pension systems. First, the benefit is
awarded on the basis of residence, not contribu-
tions. The full pension is awarded at age 65 on the
basis of 50 years of residence, reduced by 2% for
each year of non-residence. Second, the benefit is
financed through an earmarked tax, the AOW pre-
mium, which is additional to, but integrated with,
the income tax. The AOW premium is levied on
income, not earnings, and is paid only by people
under 65. 
The arrangement can be viewed in different
ways. From one perspective the benefit is non-
contributory, being based on residence, thus ad-
dressing problems of coverage. On the other hand,
it is financed from the AOW premium and so can
be regarded as based on contributions, but through
income tax rather than a payroll tax. Each of these
views is valid, and each has support from a differ-
ent political perspective; thus it is perhaps not sur-
prising that the system has been long lived. The
trick, from a coverage perspective, is to require
contributions, but not to make benefits conditional
on a person’s contribution record. 
The non-contributory universal pension is com-
bined with a system of occupational pensions by
industry. Although, in a formal sense, such pen-
sions are voluntary, once an industry chooses a
scheme, participation is compulsory for workers in
the industry. Over 90% of the workforce partici-
pate in an occupational pension. In recent years,
there has been a move from final-salary schemes
to career average. Typically these are hybrid de-
fined-benefit-defined-contribution schemes, with
benefits based on career averages and with adjust-
ments of both contribution rates and accrued liabil-
ities depending on the solvency position of the
fund. Thus, pension funds have responded in ways
that share risks among workers, employers, and
pensioners more broadly than in either a conven-
tional defined-benefit system (where the risk in a
pure scheme falls on the employer) or a conven-
tional defined-contribution scheme (where the risk
in a pure scheme falls on the worker). 
New Zealand
The bedrock of the system is a non-contributory
universal pension (New Zealand Superannuation)
paid from general taxation to all persons over 65
who pass a residency test. The pension is 72.5% of
the net average wage for a married couple, and
more per person for singles. The basic pension is
supplemented by voluntary savings, which, unusu-
ally, for many years received no tax advantages.
The country is also an outlier in that there is no
mandatory earnings-related pension. 
The savings regime was reformed in 2007 with
the introduction of KiwiSaver, a defined-contribu-
tion scheme, with tax advantages together with a
flat-rate subsidy at least partly to cover administra-
tive costs, and with automatic enrolment, so that a
worker who wishes to opt out has to take positive
action to do so. The design is simple, in part in
recognition of the problems of consumer choice
discussed earlier.
Since the pension benefit is universal, exceeds
the poverty line, and is based on residence rather
than a history of paid work, it is not surprising that,
as with arrangements in the Netherlands, the sys-
tem is highly effective in relieving poverty. The
approach also addresses the gender inequalities
that often arise with contributory systems, and it
accommodates diverse labour market arrange-
ments and fluid family structures, since, for exam-
ple, a woman’s flat-rate pension depends neither
on her own record of contributions nor that of her
husband. 
The system is popular. A referendum in
September 1997 on replacing the tax-financed flat-
rate pension with mandatory funded individual ac-
counts (along Chilean lines) was easily defeated.
Eighty percent of the electorate took part, and
92.8% of those voting rejected the proposal. 
Singapore
The pension system in Singapore is built around
mandatory, publicly managed, defined-contribu-
tion pensions, provided mainly by the Central
Provident Fund. Thus the core of the system is an
individual savings scheme, with little or no insur-
ance in the form of annuities. 
The contributions of participants are channelled
into three types of account. The Ordinary Account
accumulates funds for retirement but offers earlier
withdrawals for approved purposes such as the
purchase of a home. The Medisave Account covers
hospitalisation and allows the voluntary purchase
of catastrophic illness insurance. The Special
Account is meant for retirement but can also be
used in a limited way for mortgage payments.
Contribution rates decline with age, on the prem-
ise that lower wages for workers older than 55 will
encourage employers to hire them. Alongside the
Central Provident Fund, a pre-retirement Central
Provident Fund Investment System allows individ-
ual choice from worldwide portfolios, although
management costs are high. 
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At retirement a person can choose to buy an an-
nuity but is not required to do so, and few make
use of this option. Thus most elderly Singaporeans
are exposed to longevity risk. Nor are there any
arrangements to address inflation risk. 
In sum, Singapore’s pension system relies al-
most exclusively on mandatory savings to provide
consumption smoothing. However, accumulations
are hampered by substantial pre-retirement with-
drawals and by low rates of return to pension sav-
ings. Thus the replacement rate (estimated in one
study at 20% of previous earnings) is inadequate,
nor is there a tax-financed redistributive element to
provide poverty relief. Mitigation of longevity, in-
flation, and political risks is limited. And the de-
sign and governance of the system are continuing
concerns.
Sweden
After major reform in the 1990s, the pension sys-
tem in Sweden comprises two elements: (1) a par-
tially funded system of NDC accounts combined
with a generous guarantee that keeps all the elder-
ly out of poverty, and (2) a system of funded indi-
vidual accounts, the Premium Pension. There are
credits, both to the NDC pension and to the
Premium Pension, for periods when a person is out
of the labour force looking after young children or
collecting unemployment or sickness benefits. 
The system has an 18.5% contribution rate, of
which 16 percentage points are for the NDC ele-
ment and the remaining 2.5% for fully funded in-
dividual accounts. The NDC element uses a
notional interest rate equal to the rate of growth of
average wages. However, if at any time the calcu-
lated financial balance of the system is unsatisfac-
tory, that rate is lowered automatically. 
Benefits may first be claimed at age 61. The ini-
tial benefit is set by a quasi-actuarial calculation
based on the mortality of the worker’s birth cohort,
the age at which he or she first takes benefits, and
the anticipated rate of increase in benefits. 
The 2.5% of payroll going to the funded individ-
ual accounts is collected by the government and
distributed to participating mutual funds. The
number of funds is large – 785 at the end of 2007.
Individuals may choose between funds, up to a
maximum of five, with a default fund for the large
number of workers who do not make a choice (in
recent years about 90% of new workers made no
choice). Funds must be approved by the govern-
ment and must accept the charges established by a
centrally set formula. On retirement a worker’s ac-
cumulated assets must be used to purchase an an-
nuity provided by the government. 
Sweden addresses the problem of administrative
costs through a central clearing house, whereby
the administration and maintenance of individual
accounts is centralised. Contributions to the NDC
pension and individual accounts are collected to-
gether, and the funds channelled wholesale to indi-
vidual accounts; thus fund managers know nothing
about individual contributors. The average annual
charge is 0.73% of assets. The system shows that,
even in a developed country, fully funded individ-
ual accounts can be expensive, and that many
workers show no interest in having a wide choice
of investments.
UK
Under the National Insurance Act 1946, flat-rate
contributions gave entitlement to a flat-rate bene-
fit. The retirement age was 65 for men, 60 for
women. For a full pension a man needed 44 years
of contributions, a woman 40. There was no statu-
tory indexation of benefits, which instead were
raised periodically.
The Social Security Act 1975 replaced the flat-
rate contribution with an earnings-related contri-
bution, which gave entitlement to the flat-rate
basic state pension and to the new State Earnings-
Related Pension System (SERPS). The contribu-
tion conditions remained unchanged, with the
important exception that a pension credit was in-
troduced for care activities. Participation in the
basic state pension was compulsory. Workers also
belonged to SERPS unless their employer had
opted out, in which case they belonged to their em-
ployer’s approved occupational pension scheme.
Under the 1975 Act, contributions were indexed in
line with wage changes, and pensions during re-
tirement in line with the greater of wage or price
changes.8
Reforms announced in 1986 changed the index-
ation of benefits during retirement to changes in
prices, extended opting out by allowing individu-
als to choose to have an individual account in
place of SERPS or an employer-provided pension,
and announced ways in which SERPS would be
less generous from 2000 onward. A further reform
consisted of a phased increase in women’s retire-
ment age to 65 to take place between 2010 and
2015. As a consequence, projected public pension
spending in the UK shows the unusual pattern of
declining as a percentage of GDP. 
By the mid-1990s, however, the UK system
faced major problems. The cumulative effects of
price indexation and the known failings of cover-
age in contributory systems created pensioner
poverty. Occupational pensions concealed many of
the problems of the public system but provided in-
adequate cover for lower earners. Further reform
of the public pension was announced, and attempts
made to introduce individual accounts for lower-
paid workers. These added to the complexity of the
222 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
8 This is a serious design flaw for the reasons set out in Barr
and Diamond (2008: Box 5.8).
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system but had little impact. Problems with occu-
pational pensions aggravated the situation, partly
because of adverse stock market conditions after
2000, and perhaps also because of overregulation. 
These problems were the background for the UK
Pensions Commission, whose main recommenda-
tions were: (a) a phased increase in the level of the
basic state pension; (b) a phased increase in state
pensionable age to 66 in 2024, rising thereafter by
one year every decade; and (c) the introduction of
a national pensions saving scheme with many of
the characteristics of the US Thrift Savings Plan
(Box 3): limited choice for workers from a small
number of funds, centralised account administra-
tion, and wholesale fund management. In accepting
those strategic recommendations, the government
made a further change: beginning in 2010 a full
basic state pension will require only 30 years of
contributions.
The UK experience exemplifies two strategic er-
rors. First, the system was changed too frequently
and with too short a time horizon. Since a central
purpose of pensions is consumption smoothing
over increasingly long lives, stability over long pe-
riods is important; changes should be made infre-
quently, announced long in advance, and phased in
gradually. The second problem, excessive com-
plexity, is in part a result of the first. A system that
was originally simple and well understood ended
up not only too complex for many in the general
public to understand, but complex to the point
where many experts had difficulty understanding it.
US
The US Social Security system has been gender-
neutral since 1961. Retirement benefits are avail-
able to workers with sufficiently low earnings (that
is, on the basis of a retirement test) between age 62
and the age for full benefits, which is in transition
from 65 to 67. Benefits are based on a worker’s 
35 best years of wage-indexed annual earnings,
with a progressive formula, giving a higher re-
placement rate to lower earners. A third step is ad-
justment for the age at which benefits start. The
adjustment is roughly actuarially neutral between
age 62 and the age for full benefits, but not large
enough to be actuarially neutral for ages after that.
There are auxiliary benefits for spouses. 
Revenue for disability and retirement pensions
comes from a 12.4% payroll tax rate up to a tax-
able maximum. Revenue also comes from some of
the income tax revenue derived from taxing pen-
sions. Currently revenue exceeds expenditure; the
excess goes into a trust fund, which holds US
Treasury bonds. At the end of 2007 the trust funds
for retirement and disability benefits held an
amount equivalent to nearly 3.8 times expendi-
tures in 2007.
There is no requirement to participate in any
pension except the public pension, but workers
contribute to an array of employer and individual
systems. As in the UK, there is wide coverage by
funded schemes, which have seen a steady trend
from defined benefit to defined contribution. The
Thrift Saving Plan (Box 3), which supplements
Social Security for federal civil servants, offers 
an example of a simple scheme with inexpensive
administration.
4.3. The range of options available to a 
developed economy
This section summarises the options available to
a developed economy. Discussion is in terms of
first-tier pensions (aimed primarily at poverty re-
lief), second-tier pensions (mandatory, intended to
strengthen consumption smoothing), and third-tier
pensions (voluntary at the level of the firm or the
individual, subject to regulation and perhaps tax
advantaged, to accommodate differences in indi-
vidual preferences).9
First tier
Countries should consider either:
• a contributory pension aimed at poverty relief,
with any of an array of different designs; or
• a non-contributory, tax-financed pension, either
with an affluence test (as in Australia, Chile, and
South Africa) or without (as in the Netherlands
and New Zealand). 
Second tier
The menu includes, separately or in combination
(and varying in the difficulty of use):
• a publicly organised, defined-benefit pension,
which may be integrated as a single system with
the first-tier contributory pension (as in the US)
or not (as in France and Germany);
• an NDC system (as in Sweden);
• an administratively cheap savings scheme with
access to or requirement of annuities (like the
Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees in the
US);
• mandatory, funded, defined-benefit pensions
sponsored by industry (the de facto system in the
Netherlands); or
• funded, defined-contribution pensions (as in
Chile and Sweden). 
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 223
9 The word ‘tier’, rather than the term ‘pillar’ widely used
by the World Bank, is used deliberately for two reasons. First,
it is linguistically more apt: pillars can be effective only if they
are all in place and all broadly of the same size; tiers, more ap-
propriately in this case, are additive, in whatever constellation
one wishes. Second, the word ‘multipillar’ has become identi-
fied with a particular form of pension reform; a more neutral
term is better.
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Third tier
Voluntary, defined-contribution pensions can be
organised at the level of the firm or the individual;
regulation (particularly of the funding of defined-
benefit schemes) is important (and difficult), and
any tax concessions should seek to avoid excessive
regressivity. 
Conclusion
A developed country has a full range of choices.
Thus it is not surprising that developed countries
have very different systems one from another,
from the US with its progressive, earnings-related,
partially funded pensions supplemented by volun-
tary employer and individual pension schemes; 
to Sweden with its NDC pension system plus
mandatory, individual funded accounts; to the
Netherlands with its system of non-contributory,
flat-rate pensions augmented by near-mandatory
participation in a funded occupational pension
scheme. But the fact that the range of options is not
greatly constrained by issues of feasibility should
not be misinterpreted: that a country is capable of
implementing an administratively demanding sys-
tem does not mean that such a system is a good
idea or that it is necessarily superior to a less ad-
ministratively demanding system. New Zealand
has a simple pension system through choice, not
constraint.
5. A brief epilogue on accounting
Since I am not an accountant it would be wrong to
trespass on the centre of gravity of this conference.
But I want to end by stressing that accounting stan-
dards matter, and not just for reasons of account-
ing but because different requirements about the
way accounts are presented can cause markets to
respond differently. The story of occupational de-
fined-benefit arrangements in the UK is illustra-
tive. The story has three elements: pension fund
deficits, legislative changes, and a shift towards
government bonds.
Pension fund deficits: many pension funds cur-
rently face large measured deficits, deriving from
three broad sources:
• During the 1990s, when the stock market per-
formed strongly, many companies took contribu-
tion holidays.
• In 1997 some of the tax advantages of pension
funds were reduced.
• In 2000 the stock market fell sharply, and again
in 2008.
Legislative changes:
• Changes in accounting rules change the way the
deficit of a company pension scheme appears on
the company’s books.
• The Pension Protection Fund, which began in
2005, charges risk-rated premiums. 
A resulting move into government bonds: 
• The redirection of pension funds towards gov-
ernment bonds was, in part, a response to contin-
ued shaky stock market performance,
strengthened by the fact that the Pension
Protection Fund charges risk-rated premiums,
hence charges lower premiums for assets like
government bonds. 
• As a result, the demand for long-dated gilts rose
sharply, and the yield fell correspondingly to a
low on 50-year indexed bonds of 0.38%.
• To compound the problem, pension fund deficits
are measured in terms of the return on high-
grade corporate bonds, the rates on which are
correlated with those on long-dated gilts; thus
the increased demand for long-dated gilts, by de-
pressing yields, makes the measured deficit even
larger.
In sum, though, in part, the problem is real, the
result of optimistic assumptions about returns to
pension funds in the 1990s, in part, it results 
from the unintended consequences of regulatory
changes, including accounting standards.
In reflecting on the state of a firm, there are at
least two questions to which it would be good to
have answers:
• What is the firm’s medium-term trading posi-
tion? The answer depends largely on views
about the future, notably whether there is likely
to be a continuing demand for the firm’s prod-
ucts.
• What is the state of the firm’s pension obliga-
tions? The answer to this question depends on
the nature and extent of the firm’s past promises
to its workers, the age distribution of its workers,
and its past accumulation of assets. It also de-
pends on the recent performance of financial
markets.
From an economist’s perspective, these are sep-
arate questions that require separate answers. It
may be that accountants do not regard the first
question as part of their remit. But, since the 
answer to the second can have implications for the
first, it is desirable for some purposes to consider
the two questions together or – at least – to think
about the second question mindful of the first.
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